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1. Introduction
There are numerous examples in the cognitive devel-
opment literature where children’s abilities appear to 
shift across ages and tasks in seemingly paradoxical ways. 
For example, studies with young infants suggest that 3- 
and 4-month-old children can use knowledge of physical 
laws of continuity and solidity to determine where a ball 
rolled down a ramp should stop (Spelke, Breinlinger, Ma-
comber, & Jacobson, 1992). Yet, when tested in similar par-
adigms, 2- and 3-year-old children do not seem to have this 
same knowledge (Berthier, DeBlois, Poirier, Novak, & Clif-
ton, 2000). Similarly, research suggests that 6- to 8-month-
old infants can detect the numerical equivalence between 
sets of auditory and visual stimuli (Starkey, Spelke, & Gel-
man, 1990); yet, 3-year-old children fail at a similar task 
(Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 1996). Such examples leave 
the field in a difficult position: how are we to know when a 
child possesses some bit of knowledge?
This question comes from a view of cognition that sepa-
rates knowledge from process. By this view, knowledge re-
sides in the head of the child, waiting to be accessed by the 
appropriate stimuli or task. Thus, developmentalists design 
tasks to tap into children’s knowledge; if children perform 
competently they are said to have the requisite knowledge, 
if children fail they are said to lack the knowledge. One 
problem with this view is that it pits children’s competence 
(i.e., knowledge) against their performance (i.e., behavior). 
Consequently, when children fail at a task it can always be 
claimed that they have the knowledge, but that the task did 
not effectively elicit that knowledge (see Sophian, 1997, and 
commentaries for discussion). A second problem with this 
view is that it leaves unexplained what is critical for acting 
in the world and for the unfolding of developmental pro-
cess—how knowledge is created and how it is brought to 
bear in a task.
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An alternative and growing view is that knowledge is not 
separate from the processes that create behavior in a task. 
That is, knowledge is not a unitary thing that can be had, 
rather, it is distributed in and across many processes (e.g. 
Barsalou, 1999; Plumert, 2008; Port and VanGelder, 1995; 
Samuelson and Smith, 2000b; Skarda and Freeman, 1987; 
Spencer and Schöner, 2003; Spivey and Dale, 2006; Thelen 
and Smith, 1994). By this view, one cannot ask about knowl-
edge independent of the task that brings that knowledge to 
bear in a moment in time. Rather, the question to be asked is 
how the specifics of the task cohere with the child’s prior his-
tory of perceiving, thinking, and acting to create behavior in 
the moment.
Direct support for this view in developmental science 
comes from work by Esther Thelen, Linda Smith, and their 
colleagues showing how infants’ performance in the clas-
sic Piagetian A-not-B task is influenced by a host of intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors (Clearfield et al., 2006; Diedrich et al., 
2001; Diedrich et al., 2000; Smith et al., 1999; Thelen et al., 
2001; Thelen and Smith, 1997). Although such studies have 
contributed foundational support for the idea that knowl-
edge is bound to behavior in a particular task, the implica-
tions of this work for cognition more generally have been 
called into question given that the A-not-B phenomenon is 
largely grounded in sensorimotor activity (Freeman, 2001; 
Glenberg et al., 2001; Markman, 2001; Munakata and Mc-
Clelland, 2003; but see Spencer & Schöner, 2003). An impor-
tant question, then, is whether this view has implications for 
higher-order cognition.
This question is well illustrated by a current debate in the 
word learning literature (see Samuelson & Bloom, 2008). In 
a typical experimental procedure, a young child shown a 
novel solid, rigid object and told a novel name (e.g., “this is 
a dax”) will most likely say that only other objects that share 
the same shape as the exemplar can be called by the same 
name (Imai et al., 1994; Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson and 
Smith, 1999). Young children are thus said to show a “shape 
bias” when generalizing novel names for solid objects. Im-
portantly, however, children do not always generalize novel 
names by shape similarity. Rather, attention to shape and 
other object dimensions has been shown to be context, stim-
ulus, and language specific, and thus exquisitely tuned to 
the language being learned (see Smith and Samuelson, 2006; 
Yoshida and Smith, 2003). Furthermore, recent studies sug-
gest that children who learn to attend to shape when nam-
ing novel objects subsequently show accelerated vocabulary 
development (Samuelson, 2002; Smith et al., 2002) and that 
development of a shape bias is related to the development 
of the early noun vocabulary (Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith, 
2004; Samuelson and Smith, 1999).
Nevertheless, there has been sharp debate regarding the 
origin of the shape bias (Booth and Waxman, 2002; Diesen-
druck and Bloom, 2003; Smith et al., 2003). At its core, this 
debate is about the foundational nature of cognition and 
whether knowledge/competence can be separated from 
performance (Colunga and Smith, 2008; Samuelson and 
Horst, 2008; Smith and Samuelson, 2006). Booth, Waxman, 
and Huang (2005), and Bloom and colleagues (Bloom, 2000; 
Bloom and Markson, 1998; Diesendruck and Bloom, 2003) 
argue that children’s biased attention to shape reflects their 
conceptual understanding that shape is an important indica-
tor of object kind. These arguments stem from a traditional 
view of cognition that parses mental activity into discrete 
and separable processes of sensing, thinking, and acting. 
In contrast, Smith and colleagues argue that the shape bias 
is an attentional bias that itself is the developmental prod-
uct of the child’s exposure to a language in which solidity 
and category organization by shape are highly correlated 
(Smith, 2000; Smith and Samuelson, 2006). This idea stems 
from the view of cognition that sees knowledge as embed-
ded in process and denies a separation between sensing, 
thinking, and acting.
Critically, progress in this debate has been hampered by 
the fact that little attention has been paid to differences in the 
tasks and stimuli used to elicit noun generalizations in stud-
ies that purport to support one view over another. In this 
way, then, the word learning literature mirrors the larger de-
velopmental and cognitive science literatures both in terms 
of the existing disagreements concerning the nature of the 
cognitive system and in the need for a greater understand-
ing of how the specifics of a task elicit knowledge in a mo-
ment. In the present paper, we examine these issues via a 
case study that probes similarities and differences in chil-
dren’s novel noun generalizations for solid and deformable 
things and, critically, how these differences depend on the 
details of the tasks that are used to elicit those generaliza-
tions. We show how an understanding of the processes that 
support behavior in a task yield insights into the nature of 
developmental changes in knowledge.
Our work is inspired by the view that knowledge is not 
separate from the processes that create behavior in a task. 
Note that this view does not deny a long-term accumula-
tion of information based on specific experiences with ob-
jects and words. As applied to the development of the 
shape bias, this view suggests that as children learn indi-
vidual name–object pairings, they learn a system of regu-
larities between linguistic devices, the structure of object 
categories, and perceptual properties (see Smith & Samuel-
son, 2006). This information accumulates over the develop-
ment of the early noun vocabulary and is the “knowledge” 
children bring to the task of generalizing a novel name 
from a novel object to new instances. Thus, when we refer 
to “knowledge” we are referring to the child’s accumulated 
history of experiencing naming contexts paired with objects 
in particular ways.
The critical question is how these prior experiences are 
brought to bear in the moment that a child is asked to make 
a novel noun generalization. In the current work, we ex-
plore this issue by first experimentally examining differ-
ences in the way children’s accumulated knowledge of 
nominal categories is brought to bear in specific task con-
texts. We examine the interaction of knowledge with pro-
cess by submitting the same knowledge to a model that 
concretely specifies critical aspects of these processes, and 
find that, as in the experiment with children, different be-
haviors emerge across tasks. Systematic manipulations of 
the model parameters that specify the input knowledge and 
processes demonstrate that the experimental pattern of re-
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sults only obtains when the inputs are processed in partic-
ular ways. This is further illustrated in simulations of de-
velopmental changes in novel noun generalization. This 
work thus demonstrates that changes to either the input 
knowledge alone or the processes alone do not capture dif-
ferences in children’s behavior across tasks and develop-
ment—it takes a coherent pattern of change in both to yield 
the specific pattern of behavioral change.
1.1. Background: naming deformable things
A bias to attend to shape, although useful for learning 
nouns such as table, hammer, and key, that name solid objects 
in shape-based categories (Samuelson & Smith, 1999), may 
not be appropriate for all nominal categories. In particular, 
deformable things such as paper, blankets, and towels provide 
an interesting test case for children’s attention to shape be-
cause similarity in material may be as important to the orga-
nization of these nominal categories as similarity in shape. In 
fact, studies with adults suggest deformable things are orga-
nized into nominal categories based on similarity of material 
(Samuelson and Smith, 1999; Samuelson and Smith, 2000a). 
Further, material substance is often critical to what can be 
done with these things. For example, while both blankets 
and towels are likely to have a rectangular shape, it is their 
particular material composition that distinguishes one from 
the other and that influences what we do with each. Thus, 
children may be biased to generalize novel names for novel 
deformable things according to material substance.
On the other hand, many deformable things do have 
characteristic shapes (e.g., shirts, pants, and socks) and thus 
shape is an important factor in the organization of these 
nominal categories. Further, while deformable things can be 
folded, balled, squished or otherwise manipulated to alter 
their shape, they can be returned to their original shapes fol-
lowing such manipulations. In addition, analysis of the early 
noun vocabulary suggests that many of the categories of de-
formable things that children learn to name early are simi-
lar to categories of rigid things in that both are named with 
count nouns (“a shirt” rather than “*some shirt”, Samuelson 
& Smith, 1999). In the early noun vocabulary, count noun 
syntax is associated with categories organized by similarity 
in shape (Samuelson & Smith, 1999). It is therefore also pos-
sible that the similarity in the syntactic frame associated with 
rigid and deformable things may direct children’s attention 
to shape when naming deformables (Samuelson et al., 2008; 
Samuelson and Smith, 2000a).
Thus, there are reasons to expect that compared to rigid 
things, children’s naming of deformables would be more 
variable and subject to influences of task structure. There 
is some indication of this in the literature. Samuelson and 
Smith (2000) found that 3-year-old children generalized 
novel names by similarity in shape in a yes/no task. In con-
trast, Gathercole and colleagues (Gathercole, Cramer, Somer-
ville, & Haar, 1995) found that 4-year-old children were 
more likely to attend to substance when naming deform-
able stimuli in a forced-choice task (see also Samuelson et al., 
2008). However, direct comparison between studies is diffi-
cult due to differences in the stimuli used and the specifics of 
the task (i.e. whether a function or property of the exemplar 
was demonstrated prior to naming). Further, the use of chil-
dren of different ages across studies also means that partic-
ipants differed in vocabulary, which has been suggested to 
be a critical determinate to attention to shape in similar tasks 
(Gathercole and Min, 1997; Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith, 
2004; Samuelson and Smith, 1999).
1.2. Overview of this study
The fact that some factors associated with deformables 
may direct children’s attention to similarities in material, 
while other factors may direct their attention to similari-
ties in shape provides an opportunity to probe whether and 
how the specifics of the task influence children’s noun gen-
eralizations. Toward this end, we present an experiment 
that contrasts the performance of children the same age 
and with the same productive vocabulary across forced-
choice and yes/no noun generalization tasks with the same 
stimuli. Data from this experiment suggest important dif-
ferences in the specifics of children’s performance related 
to the particulars of the two tasks. We present a dynamic 
field model to formally specify the real-time processes that 
turn knowledge of nominal categories into a forced-choice 
or yes/no response. The model reveals constraints on the 
structure of the accumulated knowledge children bring to 
bear in these tasks. We show that the combination of the 
hypothesized processes and knowledge accurately captures 
both global qualitative differences in performance across 
forced-choice and yes/no tasks as well as specific quantita-
tive differences.
Next, we quantitatively fit data from 2- to 4-year-old chil-
dren from a study using the same stimuli in a yes/no task. 
These fits illustrate how changes in children’s accumulated 
knowledge of nominal categories translate into developmen-
tal changes in behavior in this task. Thus, the model illus-
trates how an understanding of process provides insights 
both into what children bring to the task based on their prior 
history and how this accumulated prior history changes 
over time. The model also illustrates the dynamic nature of 
knowledge and it’s inseparability from process, and thus, 
has important implications for our understanding of cogni-
tion more generally.
2. Experiment 1
Most of the categories of rigid things that young children 
learn to name early provide clear links among solidity, cat-
egory organization, and syntax—solid, rigid things tend to 
be in categories organized by similarity in shape and tend 
to be named with count nouns (Samuelson & Smith, 1999). 
Moreover, research suggests that children learn to exploit 
this regularity in novel noun generalization (Samuelson, 
2002; Smith et al., 2002). In contrast, the deformable things 
children learn to name early do not present as regular a rela-
tionship (Gathercole et al., 1995; Samuelson and Smith, 1999; 
Samuelson and Smith, 2000a). Many deformable things have 
specific shapes but those shapes can be changed. Adults typ-
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ically judge deformable things, like nonsolid substances, 
to be in categories well organized by similarity in material 
substance, but deformable things, like rigid objects, are of-
ten named with count nouns (Samuelson & Smith, 2000a). 
Given the possibility that young children could organize de-
formable things by either shape or material, the purpose of 
this experiment was to directly examine the extent to which 
children’s noun generalizations with deformable things are 
influenced by the task. We collected novel noun general-
izations in forced-choice and yes/no tasks from groups of 
children that were the same in age and productive vocabu-
lary. We tested 2.5-year-old children because previous stud-
ies suggest developmental changes in the amount of atten-
tion to shape in noun generalization between 2 and 3 years 
of age (Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith, 2004; Landau et al., 1998; 
Samuelson et al., 2008; Smith et al., 1992), and because pi-
lot testing suggested that children this age could effectively 
complete both forced-choice and yes/no versions of the task. 
In both tasks, we highlighted the rigidity or deformability of 
the exemplar object before naming it. This was done to en-
sure children were aware of the relevant differences in the 
stimuli, and because prior studies with these and similar 
stimuli had used this procedure (Gathercole and Min, 1997; 
Samuelson and Smith, 2000a; Samuelson et al., 2008).
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two monolingual, English-speaking children 
(M = 31 m 13 d, range = 28 m 16 d–32 m 24 d; 18 girls, 14 
boys) were recruited from local county birth records. All of 
the children were from middle-class families. Half of the 
children participated in a forced-choice task (8 females, 8 
males) and half in a yes/no task (6 females, 10 males). Chil-
dren in the forced-choice and yes/no conditions did not 
differ in age (M = 31 m 11 d and 31 m 16 d, respectively), 
t(30) = .36, ns, or total noun vocabulary (M = 284.8 and 293.5, 
respectively), t(30) = .88, ns, as measured by the MacArthur-
Bates Communicative Development Inventory: Words and 
Sentences (MCDI; Fenson et al., 1994)—a validated paren-
tal checklist of the 680 words commonly learned by children 
up to 30-months of age. Data from an additional four chil-
dren who participated in the yes/no condition were not ana-
lyzed due to experimental error (1), because the child did not 
finish (1), or due to a potential language delay (2). Informed 
consent was obtained from children’s parent or guardian 
prior to the experimental session. Children received a small 
gift for participating.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Nine objects familiar to young children were used on 
training trials. The exemplar for these trials was a pur-
ple plastic egg. The test objects were an identical egg, a red 
wooden block, a plastic flower, a plastic teapot, a small bas-
ket, a rubber duck, a multi-colored miniature slinky, and a 
small stuffed dinosaur. All of the objects were similar in size.
Four sets of novel objects were used during the test tri-
als (see Figure 1). Each set consisted of an exemplar and 
six test objects. For each set, two of the test objects were the 
same shape as the exemplar but were a different color and 
were made from a different material, two were made from 
the same material as the exemplar but were a different shape 
and color, and two were the same color as the exemplar 
but different in shape and material. The exemplars for sets 
1 and 2 were made from rigid materials. The exemplars for 
sets 3 and 4 were made from nonrigid, deformable materi-
als. The exemplar for set 1 was a 14.0 cm × 3.8 cm barbell-
shaped piece of wood painted green with a bumpy texture. 
The exemplar for set 2 was an 8.3 cm in diameter blue clay 
ball with four clay pegs. The exemplar for set 3 was a 14.0 cm 
tall × 5.7 cm wide piece of yellow sponge cut into a rounded 
“V” shape. The exemplar for set 4 was an 11.4 cm × 9.5 cm 
pink polygon-shaped plastic bean bag. A white tray divided 
into two equal sections was used to present the stimuli in the 
forced-choice task.
Each exemplar had two different kinds of properties that 
could be demonstrated. One kind of property was designed 
to highlight the shape of the rigid exemplars and the mate-
rial of the deformable exemplars. These properties are re-
ferred to as “related” properties because they were based on 
the shape of the rigid exemplars and the material of the de-
formable exemplars. The related property for sets 1, 2, 3, and 
4 were rolling, fitting into a puzzle, squishing into a cup, and 
folding, respectively (see Figure 1). The other kind of prop-
erty was not based on the shape, color, or material of the ex-
emplar. Thus, these are referred to as “arbitrary” proper-
ties. Because children only saw two arbitrary properties and 
because these properties were not based on any features of 
the exemplars, the same two arbitrary properties—having a 
small design on that glowed in the dark or a sticker on the 
back—were used for all four sets. Four novel names—Rel, 
Hux, Kiv, and Gaz—were used.
2.1.3. Design and procedure
The design was identical for the forced-choice and yes/
no conditions. Each child saw all four sets of stimuli. Each 
child saw a related property demonstrated for one of the 
rigid exemplars and an arbitrary property demonstrated for 
the other. Likewise, each child saw a related property dem-
onstrated for one of the deformable exemplars and an arbi-
trary property demonstrated for the other. Which exemplar 
had related and which had arbitrary properties was counter-
balanced across children in each condition.
Children sat across from the experimenter at a large ta-
ble. Parents sat next to their child and were asked not to di-
rect their child’s responses in any way. Parents completed 
the MBCDI during the experimental session.
In the forced-choice condition, the experiment began with 
a series of training trials to familiarize the child with the 
task and experimental setting. On the first training trial, the 
child was introduced to a stuffed animal and told, “Edward 
is a very picky bear. He only likes things like this”. The ex-
perimenter then showed the child the egg exemplar. To fa-
miliarize the child with the demonstration procedure the ex-
perimenter then said, “This is an egg, and you know what? 
It opens”, and opened and closed the egg. The experimenter 
set the egg by Edward and told the child they were going to 
find more eggs for Edward. The experimenter gave the child 
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two test objects to explore briefly—a second egg identical to 
the named exemplar, and another object that differed from 
the egg in shape, color, and material. The experimenter then 
retrieved the two test objects, placed them on the tray, said, 
“Remember this is an egg, and it opens (pointing to the ex-
emplar)”. She then asked, “Can you get another egg?” while 
sliding the tray towards the child. Children were praised if 
they chose the egg and corrected otherwise. The experimenter 
then gave the child the test objects for the next trial which pro-
ceeded in the same manner. The experimenter reminded the 
child that the egg opened on each training trial. The right/left 
position of the egg on the tray alternated across trials. To en-
sure that children understood the task, training trials contin-
ued until the child made four consecutive correct responses 
or until they had completed eight trials, at which point the 
experimenter continued with the test trials. All children an-
swered at least two training trials correctly.
The test trials proceeded in the same manner as the train-
ing trials, with the exception that children’s responses were 
neither praised nor corrected. For each of the four stimulus 
sets, the experimenter introduced the child to a new stuffed 
animal and a novel object, for example, “Nathan only likes 
things like this. This is a rel, and you know what? It rolls”. 
The experimenter demonstrated the assigned property and 
placed the exemplar next to the animal. In order to reduce 
the total number of trials, and because prior studies indi-
cated that children rarely generalized novel names to color 
match test objects (Samuelson et al., 2008; Samuelson & 
Smith, 2000a), children did not see the color match stimuli 
in the forced-choice condition. Thus, on each trial the child 
Figure 1. Stimuli used in the experiment.
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was presented with a shape match and a material match. 
Within each set, each shape match was presented once with 
each material match for a total of four trials per set. Before 
each trial, the experimenter reminded the child of the ex-
emplar’s name and demonstrated property (e.g., “Remem-
ber, this is a rel and it rolls”). After the child completed the 
four trials for one set, they were allowed to choose a sticker 
to take home before the experimenter moved on to the next 
set. Children’s choices were coded offline from videotape 
by coders unaware of the experimental hypotheses. Inter-
coder reliabilities were obtained for 25% of the sessions us-
ing exact percent agreement. Agreement between the two 
coders was 94%. All disagreements were resolved by re-
view of the videotapes.
As in the force choice condition, the yes/no condition 
began with training trials. The same training stimuli were 
used. On the first training trial, the child was introduced to 
a stuffed animal and told that the animal only liked eggs and 
was shown a plastic egg. The experimenter demonstrated 
that the egg opened and then brought out a series of test ob-
jects one at a time and, for each, asked, “Is this an egg?” As in 
the forced-choice condition, the experimenter reminded the 
child that the egg opened before each test trial. During train-
ing, the experimenter praised the child for correct responses 
and corrected incorrect responses. Each child was presented 
with up to eight randomly ordered training trials, which in-
cluded at least two presentations of the identical egg. To 
ensure that children understood the task, we required that 
children correctly answer four consecutive training trials in 
order to be included in the analysis (c.f., Samuelson & Smith, 
2000a). All children met this criterion.
The test trials proceeded in the same manner as the 
training trials with the exception that the experimenter did 
not praise or correct the child during these trials and differ-
ent stimulus sets were used. The experimenter introduced 
the child to a stuffed animal, told the child the animal only 
“wants things like this”, named the exemplar and demon-
strated the property for the child before placing the exem-
plar by the animal. Then the experimenter presented each 
test object one at a time. Before presenting each test ob-
ject, the experimenter reminded the child of the exemplar’s 
property. For example, the experimenter would say “Re-
member, this is a rel and it rolls”, and then present a test 
object and ask, “Is this a rel?” After all six test objects for a 
set were presented, the experimenter moved on to the next 
set. As in previous studies using this task, we required that 
children say “no” to at least one test object during the ex-
perimental trials in order to be included in the final analy-
ses (c.f., Samuelson & Smith, 2000a). All children met this 
criterion. This provided an additional check that children 
understood the task. The order of exemplars and test ob-
jects was randomly determined and counterbalanced across 
children. Children’s yes/no responses were recorded by 
the experimenter during the experiment.
2.2. Results
The left panels of Figure 2 show the proportion of shape 
choices in the forced-choice task for deformable (top panel) 
and rigid (bottom panel) exemplars. The right panels of the 
figure show the proportion of yes responses to each of the 
three test objects in the yes/no task for the deformable (top 
panel) and rigid (bottom panel) exemplars. Analyses re-
vealed no effects of relatedness (i.e., whether an arbitrary 
or related property was demonstrated); thus, the figure col-
lapses across this factor. The data in the figure indicate that 
children’s attention to shape when naming deformable ex-
emplars was influenced by the task, while attention to 
shape when naming rigid exemplars remained uniformly 
high regardless of the task. We first examined the patterns 
of noun generalization within each task using ANOVAs. 
We then performed a set of analyses comparing data from 
the two tasks directly.
2.2.1. Forced-choice task
As can be seen in the left panels of Figure 2, children were 
more likely to generalize names for deformable things by 
similar material than by similar shape, but systematically 
generalized novel names for rigid things by similar shape. 
This was confirmed by a rigidity (rigid vs. deformable) × re-
latedness (related vs. arbitrary) repeated measures ANOVA 
in which both factors were within subjects. This analysis re-
vealed a significant main effect of rigidity F(1, 15) = 29.25, 
p < .0001, ηp2 = .66, but no other main effects or interac-
tions. t-Tests against chance confirmed that children chose 
shape-matching test objects at levels significantly below 
chance when exemplars were deformable, t(15) = −2.145, 
p < .05, d = .24, but above chance when exemplars were rigid, 
t(15) = 5.13, p < .001, d = 1.037.
2.2.2. Yes/no task
As can be seen in the right panels of Figure 2, children 
were more likely to generalize novel names for both de-
formable and rigid exemplars by shape in the yes/no 
task. Children’s yes responses were entered into a rigid-
ity (rigid vs. deformable) × relatedness (related vs. arbi-
trary) × test object (shape, color, material) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. There were significant main effects of 
rigidity, F(1, 15) = 6.32, p < .05, ηp2 = .30, and test object, 
F(1, 30) = 28.36, p < .0001, ηp2 = .65, and a significant rigid-
ity × test object interaction, F(1, 30) = 7.36, p < .01, ηp2 = .33. 
There were no significant main effects or interactions in-
volving relatedness. Thus, the data were collapsed across 
relatedness and further analyzed via simple effects tests 
split by rigidity.
For the deformable exemplars, there was a significant ef-
fect of test object, F(1, 30) = 17.12, p < .0001, ηp2 = .59. Fol-
low-up Fisher’s PLSD tests revealed that the proportion of 
yes responses to shape-matching test objects was signif-
icantly higher than the proportion of yes responses to ma-
terial-matching test objects which in turn, was higher than 
the proportion for color-matching test objects. For the rigid 
exemplars, there was also a significant effect of test object, 
F(1, 30) = 27.53, p < .0001, ηp2 = .65. Follow-up Fisher’s PLSD 
tests revealed that the proportion of yes responses to the 
shape-matching test objects was higher than the proportions 
for the material- and color-matching test objects, which did 
not differ significantly.
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2.2.3. Comparison across tasks
Analyses of responses in each task suggest that 2.5-year-
old children generalized novel names for rigid things by 
shape in both the forced-choice and yes/no tasks, but 
only systematically generalized novel names for deform-
able things by material in the forced-choice task. To exam-
ine the difference in responding across tasks more directly, 
we compared the yes/no and forced-choice data after con-
verting the yes/no data to proportion of shape choices via 
the Luce choice rule (Luce, 1963). Specifically, for individual 
children the proportion of shape choices for a given stimulus 
set was taken to be equal to the proportion of yes responses 
to shape-matching test objects divided by the sum of the 
proportion of yes responses to shape- and material-match-
ing test objects.1 We collapsed over relatedness in this anal-
ysis because the ANOVAs showed no significant effects of 
this factor. Thus, the proportion of shape choices for the de-
formable and rigid sets was taken to be equal to the average 
proportion of yes responses to shape-matching test objects 
divided by the sum of the average proportions of yes re-
sponses to shape- and material-matching test objects. These 
data are shown in Figure 3, along with the corresponding 
data from the forced-choice task.
Figure 3. Comparison of performance in the forced-choice and yes/
no tasks of the experiment. Yes/no data were converted to proportion 
shape choices via the Luce choice rule.
Figure 2. Data from the experiment. The left panels show the proportion of shape choices for deformable and rigid exemplars following demon-
strations of related and arbitrary properties in the forced-choice task. The right panels show the corresponding proportions of yes responses to the 
shape-, color-, and material-matching test objects in the yes/no task. There were no effects of relatedness so the figure collapses across this factor.
1. One child in the yes/no task said “no” to all the deformable test ob-
jects. This would result in a proportion shape score of 0 by the Luce 
choice rule, even though the child did not say “yes” to any of the 
material-matching test objects. Thus, to be conservative, we opted to 
not include data from this child in this analysis.
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As is clear in the figure, the proportion of shape choices 
made when a rigid exemplar was named did not differ 
across task. Importantly, however, the proportion of shape 
choices made when a deformable exemplar was named dif-
fered markedly across tasks. We analyzed this data at the 
level of individual children. Table 1 provides the numbers 
of individual children in each condition whose proportion of 
shape choices was below chance (<.50), at chance (=.50) or 
above chance (>.50) for both the deformable and rigid stim-
ulus sets. As is clear in the table, with deformable stimuli 
there were more children whose proportion of shape choices 
was at or below chance in the forced-choice condition than 
the yes/no condition. In contrast, with the rigid stimuli 
the numbers of children whose proportion shape choices 
was above chance were almost identical across tasks. Chi-
square tests of homogeneity of proportions revealed a sig-
nificant difference across conditions with deformable stim-
uli, χ2(2) = 11.23, p < .01, w = .60, but no significant difference 
with rigid stimuli, χ2(2) = 3.80, ns.
2.3. Discussion
These results indicate that children equated for age and 
productive vocabulary generalize names for deformable 
stimuli differently when presented with a forced-choice com-
pared to a yes/no task. Specifically, data from the forced-
choice task suggest that 2.5-year-old children think that rigid 
things are named by similarity in shape whereas deformable 
things are named by similarity in material substance. In con-
trast, data from the yes/no task suggest children this age do 
not distinguish between rigid and deformable things in nam-
ing, and generalize names for both kinds by shape similarity. 
In this way, then, data from the two tasks lead to different 
conclusions about what children know about how deform-
able things are named. Given that the same stimuli were 
used in the two tasks and that groups were equated for age 
and vocabulary level, these data suggest that differences in 
the processes that bring children’s accumulated vocabulary 
knowledge to bear in each task are critical to determining the 
specifics of their performance.
There are two critical differences between the forced-
choice task and the yes/no task that seem likely to influence 
children’s behavior. First, in the forced-choice task, children 
see the two test objects at the same time in close proximity 
(i.e., on the same tray), whereas in the yes/no version of the 
task, children see each test object one at a time. Thus, chil-
dren can make direct comparisons between the test objects in 
the forced-choice task, but must make these comparisons in 
memory (if at all) in the yes/no version of the task. Second, 
the nature of the forced-choice task is to force the child to 
pick one object to the exclusion of the other, whereas in the 
yes/no version of the task, the child is free to say yes (or no) 
to all of the test items individually.
These differences have important implications for how 
children’s prior history of perceiving and acting is brought 
to bear in a moment in time, that is, for how their accumu-
lated knowledge of nominal categories is brought to bear 
in different novel noun generalization tasks. For example, 
a relatively small bias to favor similarity in material may be 
magni.ed when children are forced to pick between a test ob-
ject that matches an exemplar in shape and one that matches 
it in material. Likewise, a relatively weak appreciation of the 
importance of shape for deformable things may be more ro-
bust in a yes/no task because judgments of the similarity of 
shape and material test objects are made independently. To 
probe these issues in greater detail, we implemented these 
task differences in a dynamic field model and simulated per-
formance in the forced-choice and yes/no versions of the 
novel noun generalization task.
3. Quantitative modeling of performance across tasks
The general goal of these simulations was to examine 
the possibility that different patterns of behavior can arise 
in the forced-choice and yes/no tasks even when the same 
stimuli are used and the same knowledge is accessed. If this 
is the case, it suggests that some of the differences observed 
in the previous experiment may arise from the specifics of 
the real-time processes that combine perceptual inputs with 
long-term memory of how stimuli are categorized to create 
responses in novel noun generalization tasks. The specific 
goal of our modeling efforts was to quantitatively fit the 
data from the experiment, that is, to produce the particu-
lar amounts of attention to shape and material we found in 
2.5-year-olds in a model that captures the processing differ-
ences underlying the forced-choice and yes/no tasks. Note 
that we did not simulate the demonstrations of related and 
arbitrary properties because this aspect of the task had little 
influence on children’s performance. Likewise, we did not 
simulate performance with the color-matching stimuli be-
cause these stimuli were not included in the forced-choice 
task. 
In what follows, we first present a general overview of 
our dynamic field model, including qualitative results from 
single representative simulations of performance in each 
Table 1.  Numbers of individual children in the forced-choice and 
yes/no conditions of Experiment 1 whose proportion of shape choices 
was below chance (<.50), at chance levels (<.50) or above chance (.<.50) 
for the deformable and rigid stimulus sets. Results of chi-square tests 
of homogeneity of proportions comparing the patterns of responding 
across the two tasks for each stimulus set are also provided.
                          Condition
  Forced-choice  Yes/no
Deformable
Proportion shape  < .50  6  2
 = .50  9  4
 > .50  1  9
	 	 χ2(2) = 11.23, p < .01
Rigid
Proportion shape  < .50  2  0
 = .50  1  4
 > .50  13  12
	 	 χ2(2) = 3.80, ns
The total number of children reported for the yes/no task with de-
formable stimuli is not equal to 16 because one child said no to all the 
deformable test objects.
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task. We then discuss the selection of the particular param-
eters we used. Finally, we present quantitative results from 
our simulations of the data from the experiment, followed by 
a discussion of the implications of this modeling work. The 
details of the model, including the model equations, can be 
found in the Appendix.
3.1. The model
The starting point for the model is work by Spencer and 
colleagues modeling the dynamics of responses in forced-
choice and discrimination (same/different) tasks (Johnson, 
Spencer, & Schöner, 2008; Simmering, Spencer, & Schöner, 
2006; Spencer, Simmering, & Schutte, 2006). Our model, pic-
tured in Figure 4A, is an extension of the Dynamic Field The-
ory (DFT), a general theory of spatial cognition and visual 
working memory (see Johnson et al., 2008; Spencer, Sim-
mering, Schutte, & Schöner, 2007). The current work builds 
on prior theoretical, computational, and empirical work us-
ing DFT to capture real-time and developmental change in 
tasks ranging from spatial memory to change detection to 
habituation in infancy. Note that by ‘‘real-time” we are re-
ferring to the time scale of processes that generate individ-
ual responses within a trial. Previous work has mapped the 
real-time generation of peaks in similar dynamic neural .eld 
models to the generation of neural representations in vi-
sual cortex and motor cortex (Bastian, Riehle, Erlhagen, & 
Schöner, 1998; Bastian, Schöner, & Riehle, 2003; Jancke et al., 
1999). However, this is the .rst application of DFT concepts 
to task-specific behavior in a wordlearning context (for re-
lated work, see Faubel & Schöner, 2008).
The model consists of an input field (top field in panel A) 
and decision field (bottom field Panel A). The x-axis of each 
field shows a set of neurons arranged by “similarity.” Neu-
rons that are tuned to respond to stimuli that are similar over-
all (i.e., with receptive fields tuned to similar values along par-
ticular feature dimensions) would be close neighbors along 
this dimension, while neurons that are tuned to respond to 
stimuli that are dissimilar overall would be far from one an-
other along this dimension. The activation of each neuron is 
plotted along the y-axis. Time is shown along the z-axis as the 
sequence of events in a single trial unfolds. Note that many 
models of similarity and object categorization compute simi-
larity as the distance between the high-dimensional represen-
tations generated by, say, the presentation of two objects (e.g., 
Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1987; Samuelson, 2002). Our use 
of similarity capitalizes on this idea, that is, we assume a sys-
tem that can represent similarity in this way and pass metric 
input regarding the distance between two items to the deci-
sion field probed here (for an additional discussion of the con-
cept of “similarity” in dynamic field models, see the Section 5 
and Faubel & Schöner, 2008). Importantly, we assume that the 
metric similarity input to the model reflects similarity in the 
context of a naming task (see discussion of parameters below). 
Note also that the strength of inputs captures the salience of 
each item. Salience can be affected by multiple factors such as 
long-term learning about which features of objects are impor-
tant for word learning, or factors such as whether an item is 
within graspable space.
The stimuli were presented to the model via the input 
field. Inputs took the form of Gaussians representing the ex-
emplar (leftmost peak) and two test objects, positioned ac-
cording to their relative similarities (see Section 3.2). The 
number of test objects presented to the decision field differed 
according to the task (see below). The exemplar was pres-
ent throughout the trial in both tasks, but its activation was 
lower because it is farther from the child.
The time-dependent processes (i.e., the dynamics) that 
determine the model’s response occur in the decision field. 
Neurons in this field interact according to a local excitation/
lateral inhibition function, a form of interaction common 
in neural models of cortical function (e.g., Durstewitz, Sea-
mans, & Sejnowski, 2000). This means that neurons close to 
one another along the similarity dimension excite one an-
other while neurons far apart inhibit each other. The local 
excitation/lateral inhibition function allows the network to 
form stable peaks of activation that represent behavioral de-
cisions to, for instance, select a particular input in a forced-
choice task. It is also possible, however, that the model will 
fail to form an activation peak. Whether this occurs depends 
on the similarity of inputs, the strength of neural interactions 
(i.e., the details of the interaction function), and the resting 
level of the neurons in the field. The critical differences be-
tween the forced-choice and yes/no versions of the novel 
noun generalization task emerge from differences in the 
strength and time structure of the inputs and from the inter-
active dynamics of the decision field. These differences are 
described below.
3.1.1. Dynamics of the forced-choice task
In the forced-choice version of the novel noun generaliza-
tion task, the child is presented with two test objects at the 
same time and encouraged to pick one on each trial. Thus, 
children have the opportunity to compare the test objects di-
rectly and have to make a relatively constrained response—
select one object over the other. As can be seen in the top 
field of Figure 4A, on each trial the model is also presented 
with two test objects at the same time and encouraged to 
pick one—that is, to form a peak of activation centered at 
one input or the other. To capture the highly selective na-
ture of this task, we made the inputs strong and the deci-
sion field competitive (i.e., neurons interact strongly). This 
allows for a detailed “comparison” between stimuli. Figure 
5 shows the interaction kernels for each task (see Table 2 for 
specific parameter values). As can bee seen in the figure, the 
parameters that structured the interaction dynamics in the 
forced-choice task were such that the decision field started 
relatively far from threshold (see hi in Table 2) and had 
strong levels of inhibition (see wiFC in Figure 5) with strong 
excitatory interaction (weFC in Figure 5) and strong inputs (κ). 
Consequently, the decision field reflected the inputs strongly 
and was highly competitive. When the tray was moved for-
ward and the resting level boosted (see hb in Table 2), compe-
tition increased and the field was forced to make a selection. 
Importantly, this set of parameters put the field in a regime 
in which the peak that formed was centered at the location 
of one of the two test objects, rather than at an indeterminate 
location or at the location of the exemplar.
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Figure 4. Dynamic field model used to simulate differences in performance in forced-choice and yes/no tasks. Model consists of an input field 
(top field in Panel A) and decision field (bottom field Panel A). The x-axis of each field represents a set of neurons arranged by “similarity”. Acti-
vation of each neuron is plotted along the y-axis. Time is shown along the z-axis as the sequence of events in a single trial unfolds. Panel A depicts 
a forced-choice trial. The top two fields in Panel B depict a yes/no trial with similar inputs, the bottom two fields, a yes/no trial with dissimilar in-
puts. See text for further details.
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The course of events as a single forced-choice trial unfolds can 
be seen in the bottom field of Figure 4A. At the start of the trial 
(back of figure), all three inputs (pictured in the input field at 
the top) are fed into the decision field (lower field in panel A). 
The decision field is given a boost of activation at the point in 
the trial corresponding to when the tray with the test objects is 
Figure 5. Interaction functions for the decision field when the model performed the forced-choice (solid line) and yes/no (dashed line) tasks. The 
solid line at 0 marks the difference between excitatory interactions and inhibitory interactions. Bars indicate magnitude of parameter values given 
in Table 2. See text for details.
Table 2. Parameters used in model simulations. Parameters in the upper half of the table structured the interactive dynamics in the response field 
for the forced-choice and yes/no tasks. Parameters in the lower half of the table specified the Gaussian inputs for the deformable and rigid test 
sets. The three values of each parameter in this section correspond to the exemplar, shape-matching test object, and material-matching test object, 
respectively. See text for discussion.
Parameters for interactive dynamics
                                                 Forced–choice         Yes/no                 Description
Interaction inhibition (wi) 7.0 1.0 How much neurons inhibit each other
Interaction strength (we) 20 8.68 Amount of interaction between neurons
Initial H level (hi) −15.0 −5.0 Resting level of field
Response H level (hb) −2.0 −2.365 Field resting when response requested
Input gain (κ) 6.7 1.0 Strength of input to decision field
Input parameters
Deformable (exemplar, shape, material)    
    Input width (σD) 60, 20, 22  
    Input centers (xCD) 21, 41, 56  
    Input strength (AD) 1.0, 1.3163, 1.3623  
Rigid (exemplar, shape, material)    
    Input width (σR) (60, 20, 26) (.80)  
    Input centers (xCR) 21, 41, 56  
    Input strength (AR) 1.0, 1.3690, 1.3670
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slid towards the child and a request for a response is made. In 
the model, this change increases both competition among the 
neurons and the overall activation in the field, thereby forc-
ing the creation of a single, stable peak centered at one of the 
test objects. As can be seen in the figure, on this trial the model 
formed a peak at the location of the material-matching test ob-
ject; thus it “picked” this test object.
3.1.2. Dynamics of the yes/no task
In the yes/no version of the novel noun generalization 
task, the child is presented with each test object individu-
ally and must make a yes or no response for each. Conse-
quently, the judgments children make concerning each test 
object are relatively independent in this task—children can 
say “yes” or “no” to each test object. Overall then, the deci-
sions children make in the yes/no task are less constrained 
and are more sensitive to the similarity of an individual test 
object and the exemplar. As can be seen in the top field of 
Figure 4B, the model was also presented with one test object 
at a time and made an independent judgment of each. The 
formation of a stable peak in the decision field represented a 
“yes” response and the failure to form a stable peak, a “no” 
response. To capture the greater reliance on overall simi-
larity in the yes/no task, we made neurons in the decision 
field more excitable and less competitive (see weYN in Figure 
5), thereby allowing more blending across stimuli with good 
sensitivity to overlap in the input. In the yes/no task, the de-
cision field started closer to threshold (hi) with weaker in-
hibition (see wiYN in Figure 5) and weaker inputs (κ). Con-
sequently, inputs (in this case, only one test object and the 
exemplar) could blend, and the slight boost in the resting 
level (hb) at the time a response was requested allowed for 
the formation of a stable peak of activation provided there 
was enough overlapping activation.
The top two fields of Figure 4B show a simulation of a 
trial where there is relatively high similarity between the 
exemplar and the test object, while the bottom fields show 
a simulation with relatively low similarity. As can be seen 
in Figure 4B, when the inputs are close together, the lo-
cally excitatory interactions among neurons in the decision 
field cause the activation associated with these stimuli to 
blend and increase over time, ultimately combining to form 
a single activation profile. If this activation reaches a critical 
threshold—an activation level above 0—the model forms a 
self-sustaining peak and responds “yes” (second field from 
top in Figure 4B). As can also be seen in the figure, however, 
when the inputs are farther apart, activation patterns do not 
blend in the decision field. Thus, no above-threshold peak is 
formed and the model responds “no” (bottom field in Fig-
ure 4B).
3.1.3. Summary of qualitative results
Considered together, the simulations in Figure 4 highlight 
that the details of the processes that bring knowledge to bear 
in a task have a critical influence on the specifics of the re-
sulting performance. In particular, note that the exact same in-
puts were used in the simulations presented in panels A and B of 
Figure 4. In the forced-choice task, the model picked the ma-
terial-matching test object which was slightly stronger. How-
ever, when this same test object was presented in the yes/
no task, the fact that this test object was relatively far from 
the exemplar meant that the model failed to generate a self-
sustaining peak and responded “no”. In contrast, when the 
input representing the shape-matching test object was pre-
sented in the yes/no task, the shared similarity caused a self-
sustaining peak to form and the model responded “yes”. 
Thus, given the exact same inputs in the two tasks, the model 
generalized the names differently, demonstrating a material 
bias in the forced-choice task, but a shape bias in the yes/no 
task. The central question, then, is whether these qualitative 
insights can be extended to provide a quantitative account of 
the findings from the experiment.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Model parameters
Table 2 lists the model parameters organized as “interac-
tion” parameters that structured the interactive dynamics in 
the decision field for the forced-choice and yes/no tasks, and 
“input” parameters that specified the Gaussian inputs for the 
deformable and rigid stimulus sets. We discuss constraints 
on parameter selection below.
Parameters for interactive dynamics: Selection of the values 
for the interaction parameters was constrained by the theo-
retical proposals reviewed above regarding the nature of the 
decision dynamics in the forced-choice and yes/no tasks. 
That is, the parameters that specified the interactive dynam-
ics for each task were selected to implement the hypothesis 
that the forced-choice task requires children to be highly se-
lective while performance in the yes/no task depends more 
on the overall similarity between an individual test object 
and the exemplar. If our selected parameters then capture 
differences in children’s performance between tasks, this 
will support our theoretical proposal about the critical pro-
cesses that underlie performance in the two tasks.
Note that in the forced-choice task, the model was re-
quired to choose one of the two test objects by building a 
peak of activation in the decision field centered on the loca-
tion of one of the two input peaks. In contrast, the particu-
lar response made in the yes/no task depends on whether 
or not a stable peak of activation forms, not on the exact lo-
cation of that peak. Thus, we did not require that the param-
eters for the yes/no task place the field in a regime that con-
strained peak formation to the location of an input. We did 
verify, however, that peaks did not form outside the range of 
the inputs to ensure that they were the result of the interac-
tion of the inputs, not spurious peaks created by noise.
As can be seen in Table 2, five parameters that deter-
mined the competitive nature of the interactions were var-
ied across tasks. Conceptually, these parameters specify how 
children’s attention is modulated by the specifics of the task 
(see Section 2.3 for further details).
Input parameters: Selection of the input parameter val-
ues was constrained by the goal of presenting the same 
rigid and deformable inputs in the two tasks and by the 
necessity of finding reasonable parameters given what is 
known about children’s attention to shape and material in 
novel noun generalization tasks. In addition, we wanted to 
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be able to manipulate the inputs to examine possible con-
strains on the interface between children’s knowledge and 
task performance (see Section 2.3). The inputs that repre-
sented the exemplar, shape-matching, and material-match-
ing test objects for the deformable and rigid sets were rep-
resented by two sets of three Gaussians. Each Gaussian was 
specified by three parameters: (1) input center (x), (2) input 
width (σ), and (3) input strength (A). The final parameter 
values are given in Table 2. In the table, the values given 
for each parameter are for the exemplar, shape-matching 
test object, and material-matching test object, respectively. 
Differences in relative position, strength, and width of the 
inputs within and across input sets can be taken to capture 
overall similarity, strength, and precision of the representa-
tional states, respectively, that were created when children 
viewed the stimuli in the context of a novel noun general-
ization task.
As can be seen in the table, the input width values for test 
objects for both the deformable (σD) and rigid (σR) sets were 
not as broad as the exemplar in either set. This is because the 
test objects were always presented closer to the children than 
the exemplar and were the focus of children’s attention. The 
fact that the shape-matching test object was a bit narrower 
than the material-matching test object in each set fits with 
data suggesting children make distinctions in noun gener-
alization based on shape similarity before they make simi-
lar distinctions based on material similarity (Gathercole and 
Whitfield, 2001; Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson and Smith, 
1999). Note that for the rigid stimuli, the input width val-
ues were scaled by .80. This fits with the fact that rigid things 
generally have more precise featural characteristics than de-
formable things.
The same input center values were used for the both the 
deformable (xCD) and rigid (xCR) sets. In both sets, the shape-
matching test object was more similar to the exemplar (i.e., 
their centers were closer) than the material-matching test 
object. For the deformable set, the greater similarity of the 
shape-matching test object to the exemplar fits with the fact 
that deformable things have characteristic shapes that they 
return to following perturbations. Similarly, for the rigid 
set, the greater similarity of the shape-matching test object 
fits the fact that rigid things maintain their shape over trans-
formations. The greater similarity of shape-matching test ob-
jects to the exemplar in both sets also fits with data suggest-
ing that children have learned an association between the 
importance of shape similarity and naming tasks such as the 
ones we are modeling (Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson, 2002; 
Smith and Samuelson, 2006; Smith et al., 2002).
The input strengths were slightly different for the two 
kinds of stimuli. Specifically, for the deformable sets, the ma-
terial-matching test object had a slightly higher strength than 
the shape-matching one. This reflects the importance of ma-
terial for what can be done with deformable things, espe-
cially in a task in which a demonstration is used to highlight 
the material composition of some of the stimuli. The two 
test objects were more similar in strength for the rigid set, 
though the shape-matching test object was slightly stronger 
to reflect the importance of shape for what can be done with 
rigid things. It is also important to emphasize that the par-
ticular strength values in Table 2 were multiplied by the in-
put gain (κ) for each task. Thus, the small differences in the 
strength of the material- and shape-matching test objects 
within a set were amplified in the forced-choice task relative 
to the yes/no task due to the greater input gain.
Figure 6 depicts the inputs for the deformable and rigid 
sets that result from the final parameters. This figure high-
lights the similarity of the inputs across sets. Nevertheless, 
we will see that these small differences had a substantial im-
pact on the model’s performance in the context of the inter-
active dynamics of the decision field.
3.2.2. Simulation details
Simulations were conducted in MATLAB (Mathworks 
Inc.) on a PowerMac G5 with dual 2.7 GHz processors (the 
MATLAB code is available from the first author on request). 
The dynamic field equation was integrated using the Euler 
method. Each run of the model in each task simulated a sin-
gle trial. A network with 101 neurons was used for all sim-
ulations. Trials began with the field at the level specified by 
hi. The inputs were then presented for 610 time steps. Fol-
lowing this, the resting level was boosted to the level speci-
fied by hb. The response was determined after an additional 
500 time steps. The response in the forced-choice task was 
found by taking the location of the maximum activation in 
the decision field at the end of the simulation and determin-
ing which of the two inputs it was closest to. Individual sim-
ulations verified that the peaks that formed were at the exact 
location of one of the test objects. For the yes/no task, the re-
sponse was taken as a “yes” if the field formed a stable peak 
and a “no” otherwise (responses were checked to ensure that 
peaks always formed within the range of the inputs). We 
conducted 200 repetitions of individual trials from each task 
with each stimulus set (deformable and rigid), and verified 
that the model converged on similar values across 10 sets of 
800 simulations (200 repetitions × 2 tasks × 2 stimulus sets).
3.3. Results and discussion
We calculated the mean number of times the model se-
lected the material- or shape-matching test object in the 
forced-choice task as well as the mean number of “yes” and 
“no” responses in the yes/no task for the deformable and 
rigid stimulus sets. The data from the model simulations 
along with the corresponding data from the experiment are 
presented in Figure 7. As is clear in the figure, the model fit 
the experimental data extremely well. To quantify the fit, we 
calculated the root mean squared error (RMS) across the two 
stimulus sets and two tasks. This value was .02 for the pic-
tured simulation. We also examined the average RMS for the 
10 sets of 800 simulations we conducted. The average was .04 
with a standard deviation of .014 and a range of .02–.06. Thus, 
the model’s performance shown in Figure 7 was quite robust.
Like the 2.5-year-old children in the experiment, the 
model generalized novel names for deformable things by 
material in the forced-choice task but by shape in the yes/no 
task, and generalized novel names for rigid things by shape 
in both tasks. The excellent fit of the model to the data even 
though we used the same stimulus sets across tasks thus 
a d y n ami c f i el d mo d e l o f c h i l d r en’s n o v el n o un g en er a li z ati o n   335
confirms the importance of the task dynamics in shaping 
children’s behavior when generalizing novel nouns. These 
simulation results support the idea that the way children are 
asked to generalize novel names can create different patterns 
of performance even when the same accumulated vocabu-
lary knowledge is accessed.
The robust fit of the dynamic field model to the data may 
lead some to question whether the model is actually too gen-
eral and whether it could “model anything”. The answer is 
no. The dynamic field equations capture strong theoretical 
assumptions, for example, that input is localized, that the in-
teraction functions are homogeneous and symmetrical, and 
that inputs can be superimposed. Thus, simulation of any ar-
bitrary input–output mapping is precluded by the internal 
structure of the DFT. Put differently, the DFT implements a 
form of nonlinear decision making where only the right con-
vergence of inputs and interaction dynamics will put the 
field into a state that creates a stable peak. Thus, there are 
real constraints on processing in this model ensuring that it 
cannot capture just any input–output mapping.
Another critical question, however, is whether the details 
of the quantitative simulations are meaningful in the context 
of the extant literature. To evaluate this issue, we conducted 
a set of follow-up analyses of the model’s performance. We 
first asked whether the ordering of the inputs on the simi-
larity dimension was critical to the results. Recall that the 
shape-matching test object was closer to the exemplar for 
both the rigid and deformable input sets. This configuration 
implies that the shape-matching test object is more similar to 
the material-matching one in the representational state cre-
ated when children view these stimuli in these tasks. To test 
the necessity of this similarity relationship for the obtained 
results, we set up inputs in which the material-matching 
test object was more similar to the exemplar than the shape-
matching test object in the deformable stimulus set. Even 
though this set of inputs was otherwise quite similar to the 
final set, we were not able to capture the full pattern of re-
sults seen in Figure 7 with inputs structured this way.
More specifically, we were only able to adequately cap-
ture data from one task at a time with the deformable inputs 
structured in this way. In order to capture children’s yeses 
to the deformable shape-matching test object in the yes/
no task, the shape-matching test object must overlap some-
what with the exemplar. However, this configuration causes 
the material-matching test object to be so close to the exem-
plar that the model chooses it more than the children did 
in the forced-choice task. This is the critical trade-off seen 
in children’s performance in these tasks—they are sensitive 
enough to importance of shape for deformable things that 
they do generalize novel names for deformable things by 
shape in the yes/no task. However, when forced to choose 
between shape- and material-matching test objects, they 
generalize novel names by material similarity more often. 
This trade-off is realized in the parameters for the deform-
able set—the shape-matching test object is necessarily closer 
to the exemplar, resulting in “yes” responses in the yes/no 
task, but the material-matching test object is stronger, result-
ing in its greater selection in the forced-choice task.
Figure 6. Model inputs for the deformable and rigid sets that result from the final input parameters. Relative overall similarity is represented 
along the x-axis, activation along the y-axis. Solid lines represent deformable inputs, dashed lines represent rigid inputs. Each set of inputs in-
cludes an exemplar (leftmost peaks), a shape-matching test object (center peaks), and a material-matching test object (rightmost peaks).
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There is another element of children’s responses, how-
ever, that the model is also able to capture—the fact that chil-
dren’s responding is variable. In particular, children do not 
always pick the material-matching test object with the de-
formable stimuli in the forced-choice task, and do not al-
ways say “yes” to the shape-matching test object in the yes/
no task. Our use of noisy inputs (see Appendix) is critical to 
this result. This noise model implies that the representational 
states created when children view these stimuli in these 
tasks are somewhat variable, although, importantly, this 
noise is coherent across individual inputs. This means that in 
the highly-selective forced-choice task, for instance, the (typ-
ically) weaker test object may be chosen if noise boosts it’s 
activation above the level of the (typically) stronger input. At 
the same time, noisy inputs mean that sometimes test objects 
that are relatively close to the exemplar are weakened such 
that they cannot support the formation of a stable peak and 
a “yes” response. Thus, the fit seen in Figure 7 only emerges 
when the right set of inputs are given to a model with just 
the right interactive dynamics. This fact serves to further val-
idate the relative positioning of the test objects and exemplar 
shown in Figure 6, and highlights the importance of the in-
teraction between the specific inputs and the task dynamics 
in creating behavior.
One final issue with respect to the modeling work pre-
sented thus far is the relation between the different interac-
tion functions used to model the two tasks and the partici-
pants in our experimental task. In particular, do differences 
in the interactive dynamics used to capture performance in 
the two tasks correspond best to different sets of processes 
in two different children, or can they be seen as task-related 
differences that emerge on-line in an individual child en-
gaged in a specific task? A close examination of the five in-
teraction parameters that changed across the two tasks sug-
gests the latter. In particular, these parameters may be best 
viewed as arising from a real-time attentional modulation of 
the neural circuits responsible for decision making in these 
two tasks. For example, the large value of the input gain pa-
Figure 7. Mean proportion of times the model (white bars) selected the shape-matching test object in the forced-choice task as well as the mean 
proportion of yes responses to the shape and material-matching test objects in the yes/no task for the deformable and rigid stimulus sets. The cor-
responding data from children in the experiment are also presented (black bars).
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rameter, κ, in the forced-choice task can be thought of as an 
attentional boost related to the amount of stimulation pro-
vided by having multiple inputs simultaneously present. 
Prior work has demonstrated such changes can occur via 
attentional systems in real-time in individual participants 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995).
The task differences in the initial resting level, hi, and the 
resting level boost during the response, hb, can be viewed in 
a similar way. The parameter, h, is a constant added equally 
to all locations in the field. Thus, rather than specifying where 
a peak should form, this parameter modulates the possibil-
ity that a peak will form by moving the decision field closer 
to the peak-formation threshold. Conceptually, the shift in 
h during the trial reflects the boost in children’s attention to 
the test objects as the tray is slid forward in the forced-choice 
task or the children are asked to give a response in the yes/
no task. Note that from this perspective, the smaller boost in 
the yes/no task corresponds to the fact that the stimuli are 
never moved within reach of the child.
The between-task differences in the final two parameters, 
interaction inhibition, wi, and interaction strength, we, are 
captured in Figure 5. As can be seen in the figure, the interac-
tion functions for the two tasks are actually very similar, but 
the function for the forced-choice task has been lowered and 
stretched. The lowering is due to the higher inhibition value 
used in the forced-choice task. The stretching of the forced-
choice function is due to the greater interaction strength 
used in this task, which creates a greater degree of inter-
activity overall. Importantly, both of these changes can be 
produced in a more neurally-realistic dynamic field model 
with separate excitatory and inhibitory layers by changing 
the resting levels (h) of both layers (Schutte and Spencer, in 
press; Spencer et al., 2007). Because these changes can be cre-
ated through the modulation of global resting levels, they 
can also be thought of as arising via an attentional modula-
tion of the neural populations involved in decision making 
in these tasks.
4. Quantitative modeling of developmental changes
Our dynamic field model captures important differ-
ences in the processes that underlie performance in forced-
choice and yes/no novel noun generalization tasks. The 
excellent fit of the model to the data from 2.5-year-old chil-
dren in these tasks confirms that the interaction of the input 
and task dynamics can result in different patterns of noun 
generalization when the same knowledge representations 
are processed in two different tasks. Thus, the experimen-
tal and simulation results thus far support the perspective 
that knowledge cannot be separated from the processes that 
bring it to bear in a task, and helps explain why what chil-
dren appear to know can look different from task to task. 
In this section, we extend the modeling work further by ex-
ploring another important finding in the literature on chil-
dren’s novel noun generalization—developmental changes 
in noun generalization from 2 to 4 years of age. We focus on 
one recent set of experiments that demonstrate changes in 
noun generalization in a yes/no task.
Samuelson et al. (2008) examined novel noun gener-
alization in 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children using the same 
rigid and deformable stimuli used in Experiment 1. The 
data are shown in Figure 8 (black bars) along with the data 
from 2.5-year-old children in the current paper. As is clear 
in the figure, these data suggest differences in the propor-
tion of “yes” responses across rigid and deformable stimu-
lus sets, shape- and material-matching test objects, and age. 
Our modeling work thus far has captured differences in the 
amount of shape responding for rigid and deformable sets 
in the yes/no task, as well as differences in the proportion 
of yes responses to shape- and material-matching test ob-
jects. Our question, then, was whether the DF model could 
capture developmental differences in responding in the yes/
no task as well.
Three developmental effects stand out in Figure 8. First, 
the proportion of yes responses to test objects that match 
rigid exemplars in shape increases from 2 to 3 years of age 
and remains high (see A in Figure 8). Second, the proportion 
of yes responses to test objects that match both rigid and de-
formable exemplars in material drops over this period of 
development (see Bs in Figure 8). Finally, 3-year-old chil-
dren demonstrate a higher rate of yes responses to test ob-
jects that match deformable exemplars in shape (C in Figure 
8; see also Samuelson & Smith, 2000a), compared to 2- and 
4-year-old children (see Samuelson et al. (2008) for statisti-
cal analysis and replication of the high shape responding in 
3-year-old children).
To capture these developmental differences in the model, 
we instantiated two hypotheses about changes over devel-
opment in how children actively represent stimuli in a nam-
ing context captured by the input array: (1) that the associa-
tion between shape and naming increases over development 
and (2) that stimulus representations become less noisy (i.e., 
more stable) over development. The first hypothesis fits with 
a number of studies in the literature on early word learn-
ing that suggest children’s attention to shape when naming 
novel objects becomes stronger over development (Gersh-
koff-Stowe and Smith, 2004; Landau et al., 1988; Samuelson 
and Smith, 1999; Smith et al., 1992). The second hypothe-
sis fits with recent arguments concerning the nature of de-
velopmental change and work using similar DF models 
(Schöner & Dineva, 2007). For example, Schutte and Spencer 
(in press) captured the pattern of developmental change in 
young children’s spatial memory via changes in the specif-
ics of the local excitation/lateral inhibition function in a DF 
model of spatial cognition. These changes in neural interac-
tion resulted in more stable representations of items in work-
ing memory, that is, reduced noise in how children actively 
represented stimuli as hypothesized here. The critical ques-
tion is whether the complex pattern of results would emerge 
when these two developmental changes to children’s repre-
sentations interact with the real-time decision processes cap-
tured in the model.
4.1. Methods
The model was identical to that used previously except 
where noted below. That is, we used the same interactive 
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dynamics parameters for the yes/no task and the same in-
put parameters for the rigid and deformable stimuli. To 
simulate development (2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children), we 
scaled the noise strength, q, and varied the strength of the 
shape inputs relative to the values used previously for our 
simulations of the data from 2.5-year-old children. Spe-
cifically, noise strength (q) decreased systematically over 
development, while the strength of the shape inputs in-
creased over development. The differences in noise and 
shape strength relative to the prior simulations are de-
picted in Figure 9.
Simulations were conducted in MATLAB (Mathworks 
Inc.) on a PowerMac G5 with dual 1.8 GHz processors. Oth-
erwise, the simulations were identical in detail to the previ-
ous set. Each run of the model simulated a single trial with a 
given stimulus set. We conducted 200 repetitions with each 
stimulus set (deformable and rigid) at each developmen-
tal level, and verified that the model converged on similar 
values across 10 sets of 400 simulations (200 repetitions × 2 
stimulus sets) at each developmental level.
4.2. Results and discussion
We calculated the mean number of times the model made 
“yes” and “no” responses for the deformable and rigid stim-
ulus sets at each developmental level. Data from the model 
simulations are presented in Figure 8 (white bars). As is clear 
in the figure, the model fit the data very well. To quantify the 
fit, we calculated the root mean squared error across the two 
stimulus sets and three developmental levels. This value was 
.04 for the pictured simulation. We also examined the aver-
age RMS for the 10 sets of 400 simulations we conducted at 
each age level. The average was .05 with a standard devia-
tion of .014 and a range of .03–.08. Thus, the model’s perfor-
mance shown in Figure 8 was quite robust.
These simulations, then, suggest that changes in young 
children’s attention to shape and material from 2 to 4 years 
of age are related to changes in the strength of the link be-
tween naming tasks and attention to shape, and the preci-
sion of the representational states created when children 
view the stimuli in these tasks. Both of these developmen-
Figure 8. Mean proportion of yes responses by 2-, 2.5-, 3-, and 4-year-old children (black bars), and the DF model (white bars) to shape- and mate-
rial-matching test objects in the yes/no task for deformable and rigid stimulus sets. Thirty-two month-old data are from the current paper. Two-, 
3- and 4-year-old data are from Samuelson et al. (2008).
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tal hypotheses have support in the literature. Nevertheless, 
an important question is whether both of these changes are 
necessary to create the observed pattern in the data. To ex-
amine this issue, we attempted to capture the pattern of re-
sults seen in Figure 8 in two additional sets of simulations 
that included changes to either noise strength or shape in-
put strength separately. In the simulations that manipu-
lated noise strength only, the best parameter values were .05, 
.045, and .038 for the 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old simulations, re-
spectively. These values resulted in a average RMS of .05 for 
the best single run at each developmental level, but an over-
all average RMS of .078 (SD = .039, range .02–.14) across 10 
sets of 400 simulations at each developmental level. A two 
sample t-test revealed that the RMS values for the noise-
only simulations were significantly poorer than those for the 
main simulations reported above, t(58) = −3.65, p < .001. This 
poor performance is due to the fact that reducing noise in 
the model serves to reduce the number of “yes” responses 
overall, which is not the developmental pattern children 
show between 2 and 4 years of age. Four-year-old children 
do show an overall reduction in yes responses compared 
to 3-year-old children. However, between 2 and 3 years of 
age, the number of yes responses increases for shape-match-
ing test objects while decreasing for material-matching test 
objects (compare A and B in Figure 8). Thus, while chang-
ing noise strength alone results in relatively low RMS values, 
there is no consistent set of changes to this parameter alone 
that can simultaneously capture children’s responding to the 
shape- and material-matching test objects.
A similar pattern emerged in the simulations that manip-
ulated shape input strength only. The best parameter val-
ues for this set of simulations were 1.00000001, 1.00036, and 
.9995 for the 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old simulations, respectively. 
Because the difference in 2.5- and 3-year-old children’s re-
sponding was captured in the main simulations with a 
change in the noise strength parameter alone, we used the 
main simulations for 2.5-year-olds in this follow-up. These 
values resulted in a average RMS of .08 for the best single 
run at each developmental level, and an overall average 
RMS of .088 (SD = .026, range .04–.13) across 10 sets of 400 
simulations at each developmental level. A two sample t-test 
revealed that the RMS values for the shape-multiplier-only 
simulations were significantly poorer than those for the main 
simulations reported above, t(58) = −6.87, p < .001. This poor 
performance is due to the fact that increasing the strength 
of the shape input does not influence responding to the ma-
terial-matching stimuli which contrasts with results shown 
in Figure 8. Thus, while changing shape strength alone re-
sults in relatively low RMS values, it does not capture the 
full pattern of results. In particular, there are no consistent 
set of changes to the shape input strength alone that can cap-
ture both the increase the number of yeses to test objects that 
match exemplars in shape and the decrease in the number 
of yeses to test objects that match exemplars in material that 
children show over development.
Overall, then, these simulations suggest that our dy-
namic field model can capture important developmen-
tal differences in children’s noun generalization from 2 to 
4 years of age with relatively modest and conceptually ap-
pealing changes to two parameters. These parameters reflect 
the strength of attention to shape in naming tasks and the 
amount of noise in the representations children form when 
viewing the stimuli in a naming context. Thus, these changes 
correspond to prior hypotheses concerning the nature of de-
velopmental change in novel noun generalization (Jones and 
Smith, 1993; Samuelson, 2002; Smith, 2001; Smith and Samu-
elson, 2006; Smith et al., 2002) and the stability of children’s 
representations (Schöner & Dineva, 2007). Together with 
Figure 9. Change in noise strength (q) and shape strength parameters across simulated developmental levels relative to simulations of 2.5-year-old 
children.
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the prior simulations of performance differences in forced-
choice and yes/no tasks, the DFT provides novel insights 
into how knowledge is brought to bear in a moment and 
how that knowledge changes over development.
5. General discussion
The goal of this paper was to examine the processes that 
bring young children’s knowledge of nominal categories 
to bear as they generalize novel nouns. As in prior studies, 
we found that children robustly generalize novel names for 
rigid objects by similarity in shape, and that this bias appears 
in both forced-choice and yes/no novel noun generaliza-
tion tasks (Booth et al., 2005; Landau et al., 1988). Neverthe-
less, we found that children generalized names for deform-
able things by material in a forced-choice task, but not in the 
yes/no task, even though the children’s age and vocabu-
lary size were equated across tasks, and all children saw the 
same stimuli and demonstrations highlighting the material 
of deformable exemplars. This task-dependent performance 
when generalizing names for deformable things fits both 
with prior studies of noun generalization (Gathercole & Min, 
1997; Samuelson et al., 2007; Samuelson & Smith, 2000a), 
and adult judgments of the similarity structure of categories 
of deformable things (Samuelson and Smith, 1999; Samuel-
son and Smith, 2000a). The current work makes a contribu-
tion by showing how the interaction of represented knowl-
edge and task processes can result in consistent performance 
across tasks in some cases (rigid stimuli) and variable perfor-
mance in others (deformable stimuli).
A dynamic field model that captured critical differences 
in the decision processes in the forced-choice and yes/no 
tasks provided a demonstration that processing differences 
can yield behavioral differences between tasks even when 
the same vocabulary knowledge is accessed. This model also 
provided an excellent quantitative fit to the experimental 
data from both the rigid and deformable stimulus sets. Fur-
ther, the model was able to capture developmental changes 
in children’s performance in the yes/no task. In this way, 
then, the model provides a window onto both the real-time 
processes that can produce different patterns of responses in 
different task contexts, and what changes developmentally 
to produce different performance at different ages (see also 
Plumert, 2008).
5.1. Real-time processes
The DF model presented here is the first processed-based 
model of the real-time noun generalization behaviors that 
form the basis of current theories of early word learning. 
As such, one key contribution of our DF model of children’s 
naming behaviors comes from the real-time specification 
of the processes that bring children’s knowledge of nomi-
nal categories to bear in different noun generalization tasks. 
Studies of the early noun vocabulary have documented a 
clear and systematic association between nominal catego-
ries of rigid things and the importance of shape for category 
organization (Samuelson, 2000; Samuelson and Smith, 1999; 
Samuelson et al., 2008). These studies also suggest a more 
complex relationship between nominal categories of deform-
able things and the importance of shape and/or material for 
category organization. We contend that the more complex 
relationship between category organization and naming for 
deformable things allows signatures of real-time processes to 
be seen in children’s noun generalizations—children gener-
alize names for deformable things by shape in yes/no tasks, 
but by material in forced-choice tasks (see also Gathercole 
& Min, 1997; Samuelson et al., 2007; Samuelson & Smith, 
2000a). Our DF model suggests that the key processing dif-
ference reflected in these behavioral data is grounded in the 
competitive nature of the forced-choice task that allows for 
direct comparison of the test objects and asks the child to 
pick one object relative to the yes/no task that does not. In 
the DF model, decisions in the forced-choice task are based 
on which input peak wins the competition and suppresses 
other competitors to enter a self-sustaining state. In contrast, 
decisions in the yes/no task are based on the similarity of 
each individual test object input to the exemplar; if the in-
put is similar enough it will blend with the exemplar’s in-
put in the decision field and will create a self-sustaining peak 
(a “yes” response). The excellent fit of the simulations pre-
sented here to children’s data support our proposal regard-
ing the differing processes at work in the two tasks. In ad-
dition, the simulations support the proposals that attention 
to material is slightly stronger for categories of deformable 
things, resulting in generalization by material in the forced-
choice task, but that things that match in shape are more 
similar overall, resulting in generalization by shape in the 
yes/no task.
This modeling work suggests that further exploration of 
these real-time processes could help clarify some of the dis-
crepancies in the literature on early noun learning. For ex-
ample, Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith (2004) found that it was 
not until children had 50 nouns in their productive vocabu-
lary that they began to demonstrate a shape bias with rigid 
stimuli. In contrast, Booth et al. (2005) found that 18-month-
olds with an average of 19 count nouns in their productive 
vocabulary generalized novel names for novel rigid objects 
by shape. The work presented here suggests that these dif-
ferences may reflect the importance of real-time compari-
son processes in determining how children’s accumulated 
knowledge of nominal categories manifest in the particu-
lars of young children’s noun generalizations. Gershkoff-
Stowe and Smith (2004) used a five-item forced-choice task. 
In contrast, Booth et al. (2005) used a three-item forced-
choice task that included multiple named exemplars and 
vignettes describing the exemplars as artifacts. More test 
objects means that children have more items to attend to 
and more comparisons to make when generalizing a novel 
name. In the DFT, the presentation of multiple choice items 
increases competition among the choices. This would re-
duce the influence of the small differences in the strength of 
inputs to the model that were critical to capturing the cur-
rent data, and would thus lead to more chance responding 
by the model (for evidence that the number of choices in-
fluences behavior in the DFT see Spencer et al. (2006)). This 
suggests then, that children may be able to demonstrate a 
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reliable shape bias based on weaker underlying representa-
tions of the stimuli in a three-item forced-choice task com-
pared to a five-item forced-choice task. Likewise, the sup-
ports Booth et al. (2005) added to their task (e.g., presenting 
multiple exemplars and a contrast item, and naming ex-
emplars multiple times in vignettes) may have also helped 
younger children make decisions based on weaker underly-
ing knowledge.
Thus, this modeling work serves as a reminder that 
when children acquire 50 nouns, it is not the case that a 
switch flips in their head turning on a shape bias. Rather, 
the behavior we call the shape bias is the emergent product 
of children’s accumulating knowledge of how things are 
named and the real-time processes of the task (Samuelson & 
Smith, 2000b). As children acquire more and more words, 
they learn more and more about the regularities inherent in 
the language they are learning. For children learning Eng-
lish, one of these regularities is that many count nouns re-
fer to solid things in categories organized by similarity in 
shape (Gathercole and Min, 1997; Samuelson and Smith, 
1999). This accumulating knowledge can serve as the basis 
of novel noun generalizations and subsequent word learn-
ing as captured by the Attentional Learning Account pro-
posed by Smith and colleagues to explain the development 
and realization of the shape bias (Smith, 2000; Smith and 
Samuelson, 2006; Yoshida and Smith, 2003). What the cur-
rent work adds to this is a demonstration of the importance 
of the real-time processes in making that connection be-
tween the child’s prior word learning history and the here-
and-now of a novel word in a novel situation with novel 
stimuli. In this sense, our model highlights that differences 
in the specific results of individual studies are not prob-
lems, but rather, important windows onto the underlying 
real-time processes that have received relatively little atten-
tion in work on early word learning.
Another key contribution of the model in this context is 
that it is, to our knowledge, the first real-time process model 
of the comparison processes in word learning tasks (for other 
process models of comparison see, e.g. Goldstone, 1994; Lar-
key and Love, 2003). Based on studies in infant categoriza-
tion, early word learning, and the development of analogi-
cal reasoning, a number of authors have argued recently for 
the importance of comparison in cognitive processing and 
early word learning (Gentner and Medina, 1998; Gentner 
and Namy, 2006; Namy and Gentner, 2004; Oakes and Mad-
ole, 2003; Sandhofer, 2001). However, the nature of the com-
parison process in this literature has been underspecified. 
The model presented here takes a first step towards greater 
specification by detailing the nature of the comparison pro-
cess—interaction of a set of neurons according to a local ex-
citation/lateral inhibition function—as well as the result—a 
stable peak of activation at a particular location on an or-
dered dimension. Further, the modeling work presented 
here explicitly ties behavior in novel noun generalization 
tasks to a more general theory of decision processes and a 
theoretical framework—the DFT—that is grounded in neural 
principles (see Simmering, Schutte, & Spencer, 2008; Spen-
cer, Dineva, & Schöner, in press; Spencer et al., 2007). Thus, 
our comparison process is neurally plausible.
These contributions notwithstanding, it will be impor-
tant in the future development of this model to incorporate 
a more rigorous representation of similarity. The model pre-
sented here used a very basic notion of similarity—a sin-
gle dimension where distance along that dimension cap-
tures overall similarity—akin to the use of distance metrics 
in other models (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1987; Sam-
uelson, 2002). Although the similarity structure of our in-
puts was well grounded in the literature, a more complete 
model should include separate dimensions for particular fea-
ture dimensions such as shape, material, size, color, and so 
on. Adding a more complex representation of different ob-
ject properties would enable fine-grained distinctions be-
tween the relative importance of features such as rounded 
corners and straight edges for rigid vs. nonrigid or nonsolid 
things. Further, such a representation would allow for eas-
ier manipulation of the relative importance of such features 
with changes in the nominal categories in the productive 
vocabulary.
Towards this end, Faubel and Schöner (2008) have used 
coupled, multi-dimensional dynamic fields in an autono-
mous robot that quickly learned to name 30 objects (see also 
Johnson et al., 2008). Importantly, this work suggests that the 
similarity structure of nominal categories—that is, the fact 
that things called “banana” are more similar to each other 
and to things called “squash” than they are to things called 
“stapler”—is emergent from the system’s prior history of 
naming, and correlations between particular names and ac-
tivation of relevant feature dimensions in a given task con-
text. Incorporating a more complex representation of similar-
ity in our model will also require, however, corresponding 
advances in our understanding of how children represent 
similarity. This has been limited in the past by procedural 
constraints such as the small number of trials an individ-
ual child can perform in a single experimental session. We 
are currently working on a new method for eliciting similar-
ity judgments in children that will overcome some of these 
limitations.
5.2. Toward developmental process
The fact that we were able to use the same model to cap-
ture differences in children’s naming of deformable and rigid 
things from 2 to 4 years of age suggests that understanding 
processes at the level of individual trials can aid in under-
standing developmental change. The developmental simula-
tions presented here point to two critical changes in knowl-
edge representations over this age range: (1) an increase in 
the strength of the association between naming tasks and 
shape similarity and (2) a reduction in the amount of noise 
in the representational states created when young children 
view stimuli in these tasks. These relatively simple develop-
mental changes are well supported in the literature. The crit-
ical insight from the model is that the complex pattern of re-
sponding we see across this age range emerges when these 
two simple, quantitative and systematic developmental 
changes are combined and brought to bear in a moment.
Further understanding of the complexities of perfor-
mance in these tasks and over development will come from 
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future work that “closes the loop” between real-time per-
formance and development. We need to understand how 
individual behaviors on the real-time scale accumulate to 
create the differences in performance seen in children of 
different ages and vocabulary levels. According to the At-
tentional Learning Account proposed by Smith and col-
leagues (Smith, 2001; Smith and Samuelson, 2006), biases 
such as the shape bias are learned products of the child’s 
experiences with language. Thus, the very early word 
learning experiences of the child influence future word 
learning via accumulation of regularities over multiple in-
dividual exposures to words and categories. Importantly, 
the DFT provides a process by which individual experi-
ences can build upon each other to influence the dynam-
ics of future real-time behavior and thereby create biases. 
Specifically, in their work on spatial cognition, Spencer and 
colleagues (Spencer et al., 2007) have used decision fields, 
similar to the ones used here, coupled to long-term mem-
ory fields (see also Faubel & Schöner, 2008). In these mod-
els, self-sustaining working memory peaks generated over 
the course of individual trials leave activation traces in 
long-term memory that can feed back and influence work-
ing memory (implementing a form of Hebbian learning; for 
discussion, see Spencer et al., in press). This system, then, 
provides a concrete process by which statistics of past deci-
sions can accumulate over multiple individual trials and, in 
turn, can be brought to bear on current behavior.
These neurally grounded models have been used to cap-
ture changes on the intermediate timescale of biases that ac-
cumulate over the course of an experiment as well as differ-
ences in children’s spatial memory abilities from 6 months to 
6 years of age (see Spencer et al. (2007) for a review). For ex-
ample, Hund and Spencer (2003) found that if adult partic-
ipants are asked to recall three locations but one location is 
responded to more often than the others, memory responses 
come to be biased towards the more frequently responded 
to-location. Similarly, Divena and colleagues (Dineva, 2005) 
have found that infants’ trial-by-trial responses in the clas-
sic Piagetian A-not-B task impact their subsequent perfor-
mance. In fact, infants who early on in the task spontane-
ously reach to what will be the correct location later, are 
less likely to make search errors on the critical test trials. 
In the DF model used to capture this finding, it is the indi-
vidual decisions made on each trial that are the critical in-
fluence on long-term memory and thus subsequent behav-
ior. We have found a similar behavioral result in recent work 
on 24-month-old children’s generalizations of names for 
nonsolid substances. As reported in Samuelson and Horst 
(2007), these young children become less likely to general-
ize a novel name for a novel solid rigid object by shape if, 
over the course of the experimental session, they have pre-
viously seen many nonsolid substances and solid things bro-
ken into pieces. A critical question will be whether this trial-
by-trial effect, like those found in previous reports that tap 
spatial and sensorimotor systems, is necessarily based on the 
naming decisions children make over the course of the exper-
iment. Answering this question will have clear implications 
for the nature of the process by which vocabulary statistics 
accumulate to create biases. More generally, incorporating 
a coupled long-term memory system into the current model 
will provide a means to further explore how the develop-
ment of word learning biases might arise from individual 
naming experiences.
5.3. Conclusions
The goal of the current work was to examine an issue at the 
core of modern developmental science and cognitive psy-
chology: is it useful to think of knowledge and process as 
separate or must we move towards a view in which knowl-
edge is understood in conjunction with, and relative to, the 
processes that bring it to bear in a moment in a task. Our 
work is clearly inspired by this second perspective which ac-
knowledges that our only window onto knowledge is via the 
behaviors we study and thus necessarily through the pane of 
the processes that create those behaviors. This is clearly illus-
trated in the data from our first experiment in which the in-
fluence of real-time process on “knowledge” is seen in the 
differing generalizations of children equal in age and vocab-
ulary knowledge when doing different tasks. It is also clearly 
seen in the modeling work presented here which demon-
strates the dynamic interaction of represented knowledge 
and decision processes in creating the patterns of children’s 
behavior seen in specific tasks and over development. And 
because we used an authentic process model that generated 
individual responses on individual trials just as children do 
(rather than mapping simulated activation levels onto re-
sponse probabilities) the DF model presented here demon-
strates the critical nature of real-time processes in children’s 
individual naming behaviors.
In this respect, this work follows the lead of pioneers such 
as Gibson (1969) and Thelen and Smith (1994) in examining 
how far the real-time processes of the system can take us in 
understanding behavior and behavioral development. Note, 
however, that this is not to say that the underlying knowl-
edge must be as limited as the representations used in the 
current work. Rather, the point is that far less may be re-
quired from underlying knowledge than might have been 
expected because the dynamic interaction of that knowledge 
in a task in real-time is so critical in shaping behavior. Addi-
tionally, the developmental simulations presented here sug-
gest the importance of understanding these real-time behav-
iors when considering the nature of developmental change. 
Thus, the model points to important generalizations that can 
be made about the role of comparison, stimulus similarity, 
noise, and acquired knowledge in directing children’s be-
havior at a given point in development. However, this work 
also makes clear the necessity of future work examining in-
dividual differences for a full understanding of knowledge, 
behavior, and process in word learning and cognitive devel-
opment more generally.
Future expansion of the model within the more general 
DF framework offers the additional possibility of bridging 
the gap between the real-time performance seen in our ex-
periment, and captured in our task simulations, and the 
long-term changes captured in our developmental simula-
tions. In particular, because this model is inspired by a line 
of theoretical, computational, and empirical work examining 
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a range of behaviors from spatial memory, to change detec-
tion, habituation, discrimination and spatial language, it ties 
children’s noun generalization behaviors to this larger pic-
ture of cognitive process. In this way, the current model pro-
vides a means to generalize insights about cognition gained 
in relatively simple sensorimotor examples (like the A-not-B 
task) to tasks that tap higher-level cognition, categories, and 
linguistic systems. Towards this end, the current data and 
model demonstrate the importance of considering behavior 
in a task, and support a view of knowledge as created in the 
moment from the interaction of the child’s history and real-
time, task-specific dynamics.
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Appendix. 
The Dynamic Field Theory is in a class of bi-stable neu-
ral networks where “on” and “off” states coexist (Amari 
and Arbib, 1977; Erlhagen and Schöner, 2002; Thelen et al., 
2001). Thus, these networks can capture stable decisions—
the “on” state—as well as cases where stable decisions are not 
reached—the “off” state. The continuous evolution of activa-
tion in the decision fields shown in Figure 4 is specified by a 
differential equation that determines a rate of change, du(x,t)/
dt, for every activation level, u(x,t), at every field location, x, 
and any moment in time, t. The basic stabilization mechanism 
of the field is modeled by an inverse relationship between 
the rate of change and the current level of activation, u(x,t). 
This means that at high levels of activation, negative rates of 
change drive activation down, while at low levels, positive 
rates of change drive activation up. The activation level that 
emerges is a function of the balance of different inputs and in-
teractions in the field. For example, when a negative resting 
level, h < 0, coexists with a source of excitatory input, S > 0, 
then the resulting stable state of the activation dynamics:
τdu(x,t)/dt = –u(x,t) + h + S(x,t)
is u(x,t) = h + S(x,t), the level at which positive and negative 
rates of change balance so that du/dt = 0. Note that τ, a pa-
rameter that fixes the time scale of the activation field, was 
set to 75.2
When the rate of change of activation at a field site, x, de-
pends not only on the activation level, u(x,t), and current in-
puts, S(x,t), but also on the activation levels, u(x′,t), at other 
field sites, x′, then activation dynamics are interactive. Locally 
excitatory/laterally inhibitory interactions are described by an 
interaction function, w(x − x′), such that
                                          we                 (x – x′)2w(x – x′) =           [exp (–                 ) ] – wi
                                        √2π                    2σw
2
In the reported simulations, this interaction σw was always set 
to 12.0. Only sufficiently activated sites, x′, contribute to the 
interaction. This is expressed by passing activation through a 
sigmoidal function:
f(u(x′,t)) = 1/(1 + exp(–βu(x′,t)))
Such threshold functions are necessarily nonlinear and are the 
basis for bi-stability. For the simulations reported here β was 
set to 5.0. This creates a relatively sharp threshold function 
and thus allows for the strong nonlinearities needed to create 
stable activation peaks (i.e., stable decisions).
Thus, the full model took the form:
τdu(x,t)/dt = –u(x,t) + h + κS(x,t) + ∫ dx′w(x – x′) f(u(x′,t))
where κ was a general gain factor that modulated the strength 
of the input, S(x,t).
Inputs to the model took the form of Gaussians represented 
by the following equation:
S(x, t) = A exp [– (x – xc)2 ]
                                                                  2σ2
where A is the amplitude or strength of the input, xc is the cen-
tral position of the input along the similarity dimension, and 
σ determines the precision of the input. The specific inputs to 
the model varied depending on the task and the stimulus set. 
For the forced-choice task, the exemplar and both the shape-
matching and material-matching test objects were all pre-
sented at once. Thus, the input equation for this task was:
SFC(x,t) = SExemplar(x,t) + SShape(x,t) + SMaterial(x,t)
In the yes/no task, each test object was presented individually 
with the exemplar. Thus, for one trial of this task the equation 
was:
SYN_1(x,t) = SExemplar(x,t) + SShape(x,t)
and for the other it was:
SYN_2(x,t) = SExemplar(x,t) + SMaterial(x,t)
The stimuli for the deformable and rigid sets varied in the 
strength, precision, and location of the test objects (the exem-
plar was always in the same location). Details of these stimu-
lus sets are discussed below.
Noise was added to the model using fluctuating ampli-
tudes for all inputs. This introduces a form of spatially corre-
lated noise that is consistent with neural principles (Dineva, 
2005; Schutte et al., 2003). Thus, the generic equation for the in-
puts including noise was:
      S(x, t) = A	+	q	ξ(t)) exp [ – (x – xc)2 ]
                                                                             2σ2
2. We assume that one time step is roughly equivalent to 4 ms, thus 
making the time between stimulus onset and response request about 
2.5 s, and thus giving the model 2 s to respond (see Section 3.2.2). 
One advantage of process-based models such as this one is the abil-
ity to make predictions about reaction time. Unfortunately, how-
ever, standard procedures for these tasks are not controlled enough 
to obtain reaction time measurements in the young children studied 
here. We are currently pursuing the development of procedures that 
would overcome this limitation. 
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The noise strength, q, was set to .05 for all simulations. ξ was a 
normally distributed random number. Different random num-
bers were selected at each time step and for each component of 
the input (e.g., shape-matching test object vs. material-match-
ing test object) independently.
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